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INTERNATIONAL LENDING TO THE THIRD WORLD
By Mark G. Leddy
Introduction
The main emphasis of this paper is on the debt repayment
difficulties experienced by the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) in the
1980's. These difficulties are a result of a combination of factors which
have led to large accumulations of debt in these countries. The
outstanding debt of the LDCs increased from $152 billion in 1975 to $850$875 billion in 1985 (Meltzer, 1987).
According to Dale and Mattione (1983), the major reasons country
borrowers pursue foreign loans are: (1) Such loans allow both governments
and companies to finance investments that will increase income or exports;
(2) Foreign loans offer countries flexibility in their attempts to smooth
the adjustment to permanent or temporary changes in economic conditions;
and (3) Goverrunents may borrow for political reasons, such as to retain or
consolidate power.
In all these cases, these countries can borrow against the capacity
to pay out of future income and exports.
Historical Development
International capital flows between developed and developing
nations have fueled the engine of economic progress over most of the last
two centuries (Clausen, 1983). In the nineteenth century, developing
countries normally borrowed internationally by selling bonds. This bond
finance was characterized by fixed interest rates and long maturities, with
most of the bonds being sold to individual investors. During this period of
history, the United States borrowed heavily to finance the rapid economic
growth which was taking place in this country.
With the onset of World War I in the early twentieth century, there
was an increased demand for credit from the European countries. This
increased demand for credit along with the rapid economic development in
the United States, catapulted the U.S. from the largest debtor nation into
the number one creditor position.
The 1930's world wide depression led to large
American goverrunents and some European goverrunents on
debts. This was the first experience with widespread
international debt. There had been defaults prior to
were on a much smaller scale than that which was seen

defaults by Latin
their international
defaults on
this period, but they
in the 1930's.

The post-World War II period brought about a demand for large
amounts of financing to fund the relief and reconstruction of Western
Europe. The U.S. addressed this need for financing with the adoption of
the Marshall Plan, which called for reconstruction on a regional basis.
Also, during this time period two major international institutions were
established: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank.
These organizations were formed out of the Bretton Woods Conference of
1944.

The IMF was formed to assist countries who are experiencing short
term to medium-term balance of payments problems. IMF lending is not
designed for development financing. The World Bank was designed to focus
on longer-term economic development and project financing. The World Bank
borrows on capital markets and lends to creditworthy countries.
In the early 1960's, the United States began giving aid to Third
World countries to thwart the spread of communism. Much of the U.S. aid in
the early 1960's was directed by the Agency for International Development
(AID), which was established during the Kennedy Administration.
The early 1970's brought about the emergence of bank lending to the
LDCs. Prior to this, the majority of lending to these governments was by
developed-country governments and by multi-lateral agencies, such as the
World Bank Group, the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and
Regional Development Banks. Bank lending to the developing countries
increased at an annual rate of 20 to 25% throughout the mid 1970's and
early 1980's (Dale and Mattione, 1983). With the emergence of this bank
lending, there came a conversion from long-term fixed rate funds to short
and medium-term lending with floating interest rates. This effectively
shifted the interest rate risk from lender to borrower.
Causes Leading to The Crisis of the 1980's
External shocks were a leading cause of the debt crisis of the
1980's. The major external shocks were: (1) the oil shock of 1973, (2) the
oil shock of 1979-1980, and (3) the world wide recession of 1980-1982.
Domestic factors of the developing countries also played a role in the debt
crisis of the 1980's. The major domestic factors were: (1) overvalued
currencies and (2) inadequate domestic interest rates (Cline, 1985).
These causes will be covered in the following discussion.
The oil shock of 1973 caused a huge surplus of funds to accrue to
the oil exporting countries, while oil importing countries were running
current account deficits. The large deficits in the oil importing
countries made borrowing necessary to smooth the adjustment to the new
situation with higher oil prices.
The major sources of funds for this borrowing were banks who were
"recycling" the petrodollars of the oil exporting countries. Many of the
banks which entered this international lending environment had no real
long-term interest or expertise in the market. Between 1973 and 1980, an
average of 66 new banks per year entered international lending (Johnson,
1987). This large increase in participants contributed to the problem of
resolving the repayment difficulties of the LDCs.
The second oil shock of 1979-80 also resulted in a large current
account surplus accruing to the oil exporting nations, while the oil
importing nations experienced current account deficits. Borrowing was
again necessary to smooth the adjustments to the higher oil prices.
However, the situation had changed dramatically since the first oil shock,
with large debt accumulations in the developing countries. Between 1972
and 1979, the indebtedness of the LDCs increased at an annual average rate
of 21. 7% (Bogdanowicz-Bindert, 1986).
The new borrowings by the developing countries were at dramatically
increased interest rates. This increase in cost of funds was a result of

the restrictive monetary policy undertaken by the industrialized nations to
address the problem of double-digit inflation which existed in these
countries. This restrictive monetary policy was one of the factors which
led to the global recession of 1980-1982.
The global recession of 1980-1982 resulted in a decrease in demand
in the industrialized nations for commodities, which are the main source of
export earnings for the developing countries. This decrease in export
earnings along with increased interest payments brought about by the higher
interest rates contributed to the repayment problems experienced by many of
the developing nations.
The two domestic problems which were cited earlier, overvalued
exchange rates and inadequate domestic interest rates, led to capital
flight from the developing countries. Overvalued exchange rates encouraged
imports by the developing countries, which led to an outflow of capital.
Inadequate domestic interest rates caused an exodus of capital to countries
where a higher return could be earned on investment than that which was
available in the developing countries. This capital flight was estimated
by the World Bank to be more than $70 billion between 1979-1982. This
capital flight resulted in less investment undertaken internally, which
increased the need for external borrowing.
The culmination of these causes of the debt crisis occurred on
August 12, 1982, when Mexico announced that it could not meet its external
obligations.
Strategies for Solving The Debt Problems of the LDC's
The strategies which may be pursued by the LDCs to deal with their
repayment problems range from the timely repayment of the debt to
repudiation of the debt. Repudiation is defined as the explicit refusal by
the borrower to pay interest and/or principal as originally agreed (Eaton
and Gersovitz, 1981).
The most common solution utilized so far in dealing with the debt
problem has been rescheduling. Rescheduling is an explicit agreement
between lenders and borrowers to modify the schedule for payments of
interest or principal. According to the World Bank (1986), 14 developing
countries rescheduled their debt in 1983 and another 20 did so in 1984.
Rescheduled loans and advances of new money have been arranged in
response to the implementation of austerity programs by the borrowing
governments worked out with the IMF. Austerity programs which have been
implemented include: reductions in current expenditures, adoption of
exchange rate policies which reflect present realities, expanded domestic
savings, and increased export revenues (Bolin and Del Canto,
1983).
Rescheduling of debt has been favored by the lenders, because these
reschedulings have not generally involved reductions in principal due or
interest rates charged. Losses to the banks have been limited to not
receiving payments as soon as originally agreed. The borrowing nations
receive the benefit of deferring payments over a longer period of time, but
no reductions in payments have been negotiated.

When rescheduling has been used, it has generally not resulted in
economic recovery in debtor nations. According to Sachs (1986), of the
countries who rescheduled bank debt between 1978 and 1981, before the onset
of the global debt crisis, only one country, Turkey, has experienced
increased per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The remaining countries
have experienced decreases of 5. 8% to 28. 2% in GDP and do not have access
to capital markets. This is compared to a 7. 8% decline in GDP for all
countries with debt servicing problems between 1981 and 1986. Also, many
of these countries have been forced to reschedule debt more than once.
Another solution being considered is debt-equity swaps. This
involves the exchange of debt for equity in corporations in the debtor
countries. The normal procedure is for a bank holding LDC debt to sell it
to a broker who in turn sells the debt to a multinational firm that wishes
to begin or expand production in a particular debtor country. Currently,
the debt-equity swap market is not of great size or breadth. Chile, with
swaps approaching $750 million in 1986, has been the most active debtor
country in the debt-equity swap market. Other active countries are Mexico,
Argentina, and the Philippines.
The value of the LDC debt to be swapped is determined in a well
functioning secondary market in which banks can sell loans in their
portfolios. LDC loans sell at discounts to their value. Values range from
7 cents per dollar of loan value for a Bolivian loan to 85 cents per
dollar of loan value for a Colombian loan (Dornbusch, 1987).
Advantages of debt-equity swaps cited by de Vries (1987) include:
(1) Developing countries gain through increased domestic investment and
reduced external debt; (2) Banks are able to work down their LDC exposure
capital ratios; (3) Smaller banks can obtain a means for graceful exit
from international lending, although at a charge to their earnings; and (4)
Confidence in the LDCs could be enhanced as they convert debt obligations
to equity finance.
A problem of debt-equity swaps is that this may discourage private
investment which may have otherwise occurred. Also, some countries may be
fearful of the foreign control of corporations which is implied with debt
equity swaps. However, the benefits of rapid debt reduction could possibly
outweigh these negative factors.
Two solutions which have been proposed by United States government
officials to deal with the debt crisis are the Baker Plan and the Bradley
Plan.
The Baker Plan was proposed by Treasury Secretary James Baker III
in October 1985 at the IMF meeting in Seoul, Korea. He called upon the
banks to put up $20 billion in new money lending to the LDCs over a three
year period. He also called upon the multi-lateral institutions to supply
an additional $9 billion in new loans in return for policy adjustments in
the debtor governments. Debtor nation governments were also expected to
continue to meet interest obligations on a timely basis.
The goal of the Baker Plan was to promote a growth oriented
strategy in the LDCs. Whereby, the LDCs could use this new money for
productive investments in an attempt to grow themselves out of their
debt problems. However, Baker's call for new credit has gone largely
unheeded, with banks unwilling to extend additional credit to
countries perceived as bad credit risks.

The Bradley Plan was proposed by Senator Bill Bradley of New
Jersey. This plan is based upon debt relief rather than debt rescheduling
and full interest servicing. The exact nature of the debt relief would be
determined by negotiations on a case-by-case approach, with debt relief
being conditional on economic policy reforms in the debtor nation. The
plan also calls for an annual debt summit which would be part of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) process.
The Bradley Plan is unique in that it endorses the use of debt
relief rather than rescheduling. This shift toward debt relief has the
advantage of allowing the most severely affected debtor nations an avenue
of escape from their heavy burden of debt. However, debt relief must be
targeted toward the most severely affected countries in order to protect
the integrity of the international financial system.
Underlying all these solutions to the debt crisis are the benefits
which will accrue to the debtor nations through open access to
international trade. Foreign trade opportunities are the only way debt
laden developing countries can earn their way out of their predicament and
expand their domestic economies again (Clausen, 1983). This access to
foreign trade will allow the debtor nations to earn the foreign exchange
needed to pay their debt obligations. Increases in foreign exchange
earnings will also allow these countries to address the poverty problems
which are prevalent in many them.
The large United States trade deficits which have occurred in the
past few years have greatly benefited the developing nations. Virtually
all the increase in exports from Latin America between the first quarter of
1983 and the first quarter of 1985 went to the U. S. (Bogdanowicz-Bindert,
1986). However, the protectionist sentiment which is emerging in the U. S.
would greatly restrict the flow of goods from these developing countries,
which would further dampen the ability of these countries to meet their
foreign debt obligations.
Conclusion
The current debt problem is solvable, but it will require a
concerted effort between industrialized nations and debtor nations to find
a workable solution. The current solution of simply rescheduling the debt
does not appear to be working. Therefore, there may need to be some
selective debt relief offered to the most severely affected countries.
Debt relief is justified in some instances by the fact that in some cases,
the banks involved in international lending were guilty of lending for
other than productive purposes. Loans were issued for unproductive
purposes and an adequate examination of the repayment capacity of many
countries was not made.
The realization that loans may need to be written down or written
off is shown by the recent action taken by many of the major banks to
establish loan reserves in the event of further repayment difficulties.
Citicorp was the leader in this action, when they announced their
intentions in May 1987 to add $3 billion to their loan reserves to offset
potential losses on loans to the LDCs.

Whatever solution to the debt cr1s1s is eventually pursued, whether
it be continued rescheduling or some other method, the ultimate goal should
be to restore the debtor countries' open access to the international
financial markets.
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